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Introduction 
Thanks Michael, it is great to be here at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. 
I am delighted to see so many friends, former colleagues, and 
especially former members of the Legal Adviser’s office both as 
speakers and in the audience. 
As many of you know, Dean Scharf and Paul Williams, both 
alumni of the Legal Adviser’s office, edited an excellent book a few 
years ago about the Office of the Legal Adviser, entitled “Shaping 
Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis,” which included essays and 
interviews by ten former Legal Advisers.1  Michael and Paul gave me 
an opportunity to reflect on my four eventful years as Legal Adviser 
 
* Partner, Arnold & Porter; Adjunct Senior Fellow in International and 
National Security Law, Council on Foreign Relations.  The author served as 
Legal Adviser to the Department of State from 2005-2009 and as Senior 
Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National 
Security Council, The White House, from 2001-2005.   This article is an 
adaption of a speech made at Case Western Reserve University Law School, 
September 14, 2018. The author acknowledges Katelyn Horne, an associate 
at Arnold & Porter, for her assistance in preparing the footnotes for these 
remarks. 
1. See generally Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, SHAPING FOREIGN 
POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (2010) (discussing all ten of the living 
former U.S. State Department legal advisers’ accounts of the role that 
international law played during the major crises on each of their watches). 
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from 2005 to 2009. They also gave me my first paycheck after leaving 
government, for which I am grateful. 
I want to single out two other speakers for recognition. Todd 
Buchwald, with whom I worked closely for all eight years while I was 
NSC and State Department Legal Adviser, is one of the best lawyers 
and public servants I have ever known. Whenever I needed 
trustworthy advice on the knottiest of legal issues, I would turn to 
Todd. His retirement earlier this year was a huge loss for the State 
Department. And I want to recognize our other keynote speaker, Elisa 
Massimino, who left Human Rights First earlier this year after 
twenty-seven years, including ten years as President. Elisa would 
meet with me regularly when I was Legal Adviser and we have 
worked closely together for the last nine years. In my mind, she is a 
model human rights advocate—calm, measured, and persuasive. 
Elisa’s retirement earlier this year was an equal loss to the human 
rights community. I want to applaud both Todd and Elisa for their 
past service and to say I look forward to their future contributions. 
As many of you know, two years ago in August 2016, I drafted a 
statement of fifty former national security officials who had served in 
Republican administrations in which we said that Donald Trump 
lacks the “character, values, and experience to be President.”2 Here 
are a few quotations from the statement: 
● “He weakens U.S. moral authority as the leader of the free 
world. He appears to lack basic knowledge about and belief in 
the U.S. Constitution, U.S. laws, and U.S. institutions…”3 
● “[H]e persistently compliments our adversaries and threatens 
our allies and friends.”4 
● He continues to display an alarming ignorance of basic facts 
of contemporary international politics.5  
● He is unable or unwilling to separate truth from falsehood. He 
does not encourage conflicting views. He lacks self-control and 
acts impetuously. He cannot tolerate personal criticism.6  
We concluded by saying that, “[W]e are convinced that he would 
be a dangerous President and would put at risk our country’s national 
 
2. Donald B. Ayer et al., STATEMENT BY FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY 




6. Id. at 2. 
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security and well-being.”7 If elected, we said he would be “the most 
reckless President in American history.”8 
From a national security perspective, the last twenty months of 
President Trump’s presidency have been even worse than many of us 
imagined. Rather than making the United States respected around the 
world, President Trump has withdrawn from international 
agreements,9 launched destabilizing trade wars with China and 
Europe,10 criticized and undermined NATO,11 picked fights with our 
closest allies,12 gutted our State Department,13 stoked unnecessary 
international controversies,14 and praised dictators and authoritarian 
leaders like Kim Jung Un and Vladimir Putin.15 Rather than 
 
7. Id. at 1. 
8. Id. at 2. 
9. Hasan Dudar & Deirdre Shesgreen, Trump’s Long List of Global Trade 




10. See Zachary Basu, Steel, Soybeans and NAFTA 2.0: A Year of Trump’s 
Trade Wars, AXIOS (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-trade-
war-2018-china-europe-mexico-canada-nafta-1e2ef110-55c3-48d2-9ec3-
81af22a70859.html [https://perma.cc/N5TM-69ZS] (“President Trump 
thoroughly upended the global trading system in 2018, slapping tariffs on 
billions of dollars’ worth of imports as he pledged to ‘put American first’ 
and renegotiate more favorable trade deals for the U.S. around the world”). 
11. Cf. Dan de Luce et al., Trump’s Shadow Hangs Over NATO, FOREIGN 
POLICY (Jan. 29, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/ 
01/29/trumps-shadow-hangs-over-nato-transatlantic-alliance-europe-defense-
deterrence-europe-mattis-jens-stoltenberg/[https://perma.cc/ XC2X-DFZJ] 
(“And the president’s tone and words have planted serious doubts about 
whether the United States will deliver in a crisis”). 
12. See John T. Bennett, Analysis: Trump Wanted a Fight. He Found One--
with His Allies, ROLLCALL (Jun. 8, 2018, 12:26 PM) https:// 
www.rollcall.com/news/politics/analysis-trump-wanted-fight-found-one-
allies [https://perma.cc/ EWX2-LRL2] (“If Trump was looking to pick a 
fight, he succeeded”).  
13. See Robbie Gramer et al., How The Trump Administration Broke The State 
Department, FOREIGN POLICY (July 31, 2017), https:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/how-the-trump-administration-broke-the-
state-department/ [https://perma.cc/9GAQ-BLY7] (“A hostile White 
House is slashing its budget, the rank and file are cut off from a detached 
leader, and morale has plunged to historic lows”).  
14. Bennett, supra note 12. 
15. See Krishnadev Calamur, Why The President Praises Dictators, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 13, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive 
/2019/01/trumps-delight-for-putin-duterte-and-mussolini/579652/ 
[https://perma.cc/BL3D-VN5Z] (discussing Donald Trump’s encouragement 
of authoritarian leaders). 
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exercising American diplomatic and moral leadership, as past 
Presidents have done, President Trump has isolated the United States 
from the rest of the world more than at any point in history.       
But what is the Trump administration’s approach to international 
law and institutions? 
As a candidate, Donald Trump famously attacked numerous 
international agreements negotiated by his predecessors, including 
NAFTA, TPP, the Paris Climate Change Agreement, and the Iran 
deal.16 In Trump’s view, each of these was the “worst deal” ever 
negotiated.17 Candidate Trump even criticized the “eggheads” who 
negotiated the Geneva Conventions after he was told that the Geneva 
Conventions prohibited torture.18 
Early in the Trump administration, my friend and former 
colleague, Jack Goldsmith, wrote at Lawfare that “we are witnessing 
the beginnings of the greatest presidential onslaught on international 
law and international institutions in American history.”19  For much 
of the last eighteen months, I had thought this assessment was 
exaggerated.   Although the President and his administration took 
numerous policy actions with which I disagreed vigorously (such as 
the travel ban, the trade wars, and the withdrawal from Paris and the 
Iran agreements), none of them were really direct attacks on 
international law and institutions. 
One reason for this may have been that President Trump himself 
did not have enough experience with international law and courts to 
have strong views about them.  Moreover, his initial senior national 
security advisers—Rex Tillerson, Jim Mattis, and HR McMaster—
were not international law skeptics.   Far from encouraging the 
President to attack international law, they apparently urged him to 
comply with it.20  And none of the administration’s national security 
 
16. Dudar & Shesgreen, supra note 9. 
17. See, e.g., Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on 
Shaky Ground, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:16 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran-idUSKBN13 
427E [https://perma.cc/V554-7FD2] (referring to the Iran Nuclear Deal as 
such).  
18. Jane C. Timm, The 141 Stances Donald Trump Took During His White 
House Bid, NBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www. 
nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/full-list-donald-trump-s-rapidly-
changing-policy-positions-n547801 [https://perma.cc/N7Z3-ZSEA]. 
19. Jack Goldsmith, The Trump Onslaught on International Law and 
Institutions, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2017, 10:09 AM), https://www. 
lawfareblog.com/trump-onslaught-international-law-and-institutions 
[https://perma.cc/848Q-UYKC]. 
20. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, Trump Gets the National Security Advisor 
McMaster Tried to Prevent, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 2018, 10:59 PM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-gets-the-national-security-adviser-
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lawyers entered the administration with a strong anti-international 
law bias. 
Perhaps as a result, despite numerous other controversial 
international actions, for its first 18 months, the Trump 
administration did not engage in direct attacks on international law 
and institutions.   
This approach may now be changing.   With the appointment of 
John Bolton as National Security Advisor in March,21 the 
administration appears to be taking a more aggressive approach.   
Ambassador Bolton is well-known for his skepticism, if not hostility, 
towards international law and international institutions.22   Since 
taking office, he has strongly criticized the International Criminal 
Court and the International Court of Justice.23  He personally 
announced the closing of the PLO Office in Washington as well as the 
United States’ withdrawal from the Treaty of Amity with Iran and 
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations.24  The United States also announced that it would 
 
mcmaster-tried-to-prevent [http://perma.cc/TH35-W6X3] (discussing 
McMaster’s distance from Donald Trump’s involvement with Russia). 
21. Greg Jaffe & Josh Dawsey, Trump Names Former Ambassador John Bolton 





22. Nomination of John R. Bolton: Hearing Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of John R. Bolton, then 
nominee for US Ambassador to U.N, “It is a big mistake for us to grant any 
validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term 
interest to do so--because, over the long term, the goal of those who think 
that international law really means anything are those who want to 
constrict the United States”).  
23. Owen Bowcott et al., John Bolton Threatens War Crimes Court with 
Sanctions in Virulent Attack, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2018, 2:49 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/10/john-bolton-castigate-
icc-washington-speech [https://perma.cc/VP3B-MJAC];  Natasha Turak, 
US Rejects International Court of Justice Ruling on Iran, Continuing its 




24. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Closure of the PLO Office in 
Washington (Sept. 20, 2018) (on file with U.S. State Department Bureau of 
Public Affairs); Roberta Rampton et al., U.S. Withdraws from International 
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withdraw from the U.N. Human Rights Council.25  These actions may 
reflect the beginning of the “presidential onslaught on international 
law and international institutions” that Jack Goldsmith predicted.26   
In this essay, I will address the Trump administration’s approach 
to international courts and tribunals, to treaties and international 
agreements, and to international human rights.   
International Courts and Tribunals 
Let me start with the Trump administration’s approach to 
international courts and tribunals, starting with the International 
Criminal Court, which was the principal subject of Ambassador 
Bolton’s speech on September 10.27        
The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
As most of you know, the U.S. Government has had a turbulent 
relationship with the ICC.  During the Clinton administration, the 
United States participated actively in the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute, the treaty that created the ICC, but ultimately voted against 
the final text because of concerns that the treaty lacked sufficient 
safeguards against politically motivated investigations of Americans.28   
Although President Clinton ultimately authorized U.S. negotiators to 
sign the treaty, he said that the U.S. would not submit it to the 
Senate for approval until U.S. concerns were addressed.29  In its first 
term, the Bush administration adopted a hostile approach towards 
the ICC.  Ambassador Bolton, when he was Under Secretary of State, 
sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary General in 2002 informing the U.N. 
that the U.S. did not intend to become a party to the Rome 
Statute—this became known as the U.S. “unsigning” of the Rome 
 
25. Carol Morello, U.S. Withdraws from U.N. Human Rights Council over 





26. Goldsmith, supra note 19. 
27. John Bolton, National Security Adviser, Nat. Sec’y Council, Address to the 
Federalist Society at the Mayflower Hotel: Protecting American 
Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats (Sept. 10, 
2018). 
28. See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 529, 532-33 (1999). 
29. Clinton Administration: 1993-2001, AMICC, https://www.amicc.org/ 
clinton-administration (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ Q8D2-
7WT2]. 
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Statute.30  Ambassador Bolton reportedly said that this was the 
“happiest day of his life.”31  In its second term, the Bush 
administration adopted a more pragmatic approach to the ICC.  
While continuing to dispute ICC jurisdiction over Americans, it 
agreed to the U.N. Security Council resolution referring the Darfur 
genocide for investigation by the ICC and President George W. Bush 
waived restrictions on counterterrorism assistance to many ICC 
members after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice publicly remarked 
in 2006 that the restrictions were like “shooting ourselves in the 
foot.”32   During its eight years, the Obama administration continued 
the Bush administration’s pragmatic approach to the ICC, offering 
assistance to the ICC for certain investigations while continuing to 
dispute the ICC’s jurisdiction over Americans.33  
Somewhat surprisingly, given historic opposition among 
conservative Republicans towards the ICC, the Trump administration 
did not criticize the ICC for its first twenty months.34  This quiet was 
all the more surprising because the ICC Prosecutor had recommended 
in December 2017 that the ICC’s pre-trial chamber authorize the 
initiation of an investigation of United States’ treatment of detainees 
in Afghanistan and also at CIA facilities in Europe.35  A decision by 
 
30. See Letter from John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, To Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary General 
(May 6, 2002) (on file the U.S. Department of State) (discussing the United 
States’ request not to become a party to the Rome Statute). 
31. Ruth Wedgwood & Morton H. Halperin, Will the Real John Bolton Please 
Stand Up?, FOREIGN POLICY (July 15, 2005, 12:00 AM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2005/07/15/will-the-real-john-bolton-please-
stand-up/ [https://perma.cc /NQA2-YHTX] 
32. Steven R. Weisman, U.S. Rethinks Its Cutoff of Military Aid to Latin 





33. Caitlin Lambert, The Evolving US Policy Towards the ICC, INT’L JUSTICE 
PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2014), https://www.international justiceproject.com/the-
evolving-us-policy-towards-the-icc/ [https:// perma.cc/N9L7-GCKS]. 
34. See John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Throws Down the Gauntlet 
to the ICC. The Court Should Decline The Challenge, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 
2018, 11:50 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com /trump-administration-
throws-down-gauntlet-icc-court-should-decline-challenge 
[https://perma.cc/8ZZ5-25TQ] (discussing the Trump administration’s 
seizure of cooperation with the ICC while the court is investigating U.S. 
officials).  
35. Id. 
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the pre-trial chamber is expected at any time.36   Administration 
officials have been aware of the Prosecutor’s recommendation but 
made no public comment about it for ten months. 
That silence changed on September 10, 2018 when Ambassador 
Bolton fired a broadside at the International Criminal Court, which 
he called “ineffective,” “unaccountable,” “deeply flawed,” and 
“outright dangerous.”37 He said the ICC unacceptably threatens 
American sovereignty and U.S. national-security interests.38 He 
criticized the ICC Prosecutor’s request to start an investigation of 
U.S. officials for detainee abuses in Afghanistan and elsewhere as 
“utterly unfounded” and “unjustifiable.”39 He said that the United 
States will “use any means necessary to protect our citizens and those 
of our allies from unjust prosecution by this illegitimate court.”40 
Specifically, the United States will not cooperate with the ICC and 
will provide no assistance to the court.41 And if the ICC “comes after 
the United States,” he said, the U.S. will “fight back” by banning its 
judges and prosecutors from entering the United States, freezing their 
assets, and prosecuting them in the U.S. criminal justice system.42 
The U.S. will do the same for “any company or state that assists an 
ICC investigation of Americans.”43 He also said the U.S. would 
negotiate more binding non-surrender agreements and take steps in 
the U.N. Security Council to constrain the ICC.44  
Unfortunately, the ICC prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, invited this 
attack by asking the court to open a criminal investigation of U.S. 
officials.45 No American administration, Republican or Democratic, 
 
36. The ICC rejected the request on April 12, 2019. See Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into 
the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, No. ICC-02/17, INT’L 
CRIM. CT. (Apr. 12, 2019), available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_02068.PDF. In a statement issued that day, 
the White House declared this decision “a major international victory.” See 
Statement from the President, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 12, 2019), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov /briefings-statements/statement-from-the-
president-8/. 








45. See ICC Prosecutor Seeks Afghanistan War Crimes Investigation, BBC 
NEWS (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41864315 
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would fail to respond to an actual or threatened criminal investigation 
of U.S. military personnel and officials or fail to warn the court about 
the consequences of such an investigation. And 2018 is an election 
year, so this was an easy softball for the Trump administration to hit. 
Remember that in 2002—another election year—a majority of 
Democrats, including John Kerry and Hillary Clinton, voted for the 
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which prohibited 
cooperation with the ICC (with certain exceptions), cut off financial 
assistance to countries that did not agree to non-surrender 
agreements, and preemptively authorized the use of military force 
(yes, an AUMF!) to free Americans held in The Hague.46 
Of course, it is unfortunate that the Trump administration seems 
to have decided that, whether the court opens an investigation of U.S. 
officials or not, the U.S. will cease all cooperation with the ICC, 
reversing twelve years of cooperation that started when I was Legal 
Adviser during the Bush administration and continued through the 
Obama administration. But it is hard to imagine any administration 
would continue to cooperate with the court while it was investigating 
U.S. officials. 
Ambassador Bolton’s other threats against the ICC go much 
further and seem unlikely to be implemented. It would be an 
extraordinary stretch of the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act, or IEEPA, to declare that the ICC presented a “national 
emergency” justifying the blocking of the assets of its judges and 
prosecutors. And I am not aware of any federal criminal statute that 
could be used to charge ICC judges or prosecutors, much less 
companies or foreign governments that cooperate with the court.  
The Trump administration has thrown down the gauntlet and 
challenged the ICC judges to go forward with the Afghan 
investigation.47 I can imagine that many of the judges will want to 
double down and not be cowed by the Trump administration’s 
threats. While this might make some judges feel good, it would be 
counterproductive and would only hurt the court and the cause of 
international justice in the long run. Few people believe the 
prosecutor could conduct a successful trial of U.S. officials, and any 
investigation of the U.S. would result in a cutoff of U.S. intelligence, 
diplomatic and military assistance to the court, and enormous 
 
[http://perma.cc/A59C-KES7] (discussing Fatou Bensouda’s request to seek 
a formal investigation into alleged war crimes committed in Afghanistan).  
46. Bellinger, supra note 34; American Service-Members’ Protection Act. 116 
Stat. 820 (2002) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 7421).  
47. Steve Holland, Trump Administration Takes Aim at International Criminal 
Court, PLO, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2018 11:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-usa-trump-icc/trump-administration-takes-aim-at-international-
criminal-court-plo-idUSKCN1LQ076 [http://perma.cc/ZQE8-7RDH]. 
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pressure on U.S. allies not to cooperate.48 There would be significant 
cost to the ICC, for little gain. 
Rather than accept the Trump administration’s challenge, the 
court would be wise not to act precipitously. Rather than approve the 
opening of the investigation requested by the prosecutor, it could 
quietly ask the U.S. for more information about the numerous 
investigations of detainee abuse the United States has already 
conducted. Even if the Trump administration chooses not to provide 
this information, the ICC might well decide that its limited resources 
are better directed towards investigating war crimes and crimes 
against humanity that are of “sufficient gravity” to justify the court’s 
attention, as the Rome Statute requires.49 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
The ICC is not the only international court that pose challenges 
for the Trump administration.   The Trump administration is facing 
three cases filed against the United States in the International Court 
of Justice—two lawsuits filed by Iran and one filed by the “State of 
Palestine.”50   The two suits filed by Iran allege violations of the 1955 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between 
the US and Iran.51   The first case was filed in June 2016—during the 
Obama administration—and alleges that the U.S. violated the Treaty 
by seizing Iran’s Central Bank assets to pay a terrorism judgment.52   
Iran brought the case after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Bank 
Markazi case that it did not violate the FSIA or international law for 
the judgment holders to attach the Central Bank assets.53  The 
United States has filed a response arguing that the ICJ does not have 
jurisdiction, and an initial hearing is scheduled for next month.54  
 
48. Bellinger, supra note 34. 
49. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17(d), July 1, 2002, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
50. Pending Cases, INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE (last visited October 29, 2018), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pending-cases [http://perma.cc/G66G-8FHR]. 
51. Press Release, International Court of Justice, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran 
v. U.S.) (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/164/164-
20181012-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/VPH7-C88T]; Press Release, 
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and 
Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.) INT’L CT. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20181016-PRE-01-00-
EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/GP7Z-THSH]. 
52. Application Instituting Proceedings, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), 
2016 I.C.J. Pleadings 164 at 6 (June 14, 2016). 
53. Id. at 26. 
54. Preliminary Objections Submitted by the United States of America, Certain 
Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), at 47 (May 1, 2017). The ICJ issued its 
Judgment on Preliminary Objections on February 13, 2019.  In its 
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More recently, Iran filed a second case against the United States in 
July 2018, alleging that the United States had also violated the 
Treaty of Amity by terminating the Iran nuclear deal and reimposing 
sanctions on Iran.55   Two months later, in September 2018, the 
“State of Palestine” filed an action against the United States claiming 
that the U.S. violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations by moving its embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem.56 
On October 3, the ICJ issued an opinion unanimously approving 
“provisional measures” directing the United States to remove 
impediments on the export to Iran of medicine and medical devices, 
foodstuffs and agricultural commodities, and spare parts and 
equipment necessary for the safety of civil aviation.57 Although the 
decision was a small (and probably temporary) legal victory for Iran, 
the ICJ rejected Iran’s far-reaching request that the Court order the 
United States not to reimpose the economic sanctions lifted by the 
JCPOA or to impose any new sanctions on Iran.58 
The Trump administration has responded quickly and vigorously 
to the ICJ’s provisional measure order as well as to the Palestinian 
action. On October 3, the same day the ICJ announced its provisional 
measures decision, the Trump administration announced that it would 
withdraw from both the Treaty of Amity with Iran, under which the 
two cases by Iran were filed, and the Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.59 In announcing the 
 
judgment, the Court rejected certain of the preliminary objections raised by 
the United States, while accepting one of the objections to jurisdiction 
raised by the United States.  The Court thus determined that it has 
jurisdiction over the dispute, except over Iran’s claim of an alleged violation 
of sovereign immunity under customary international law.  See generally 
Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.) 
(Feb. 13, 2019). 
55. Application Instituting Proceedings, Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty 
of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.) (July 16, 
2018). 
56. Application Instituting Proceedings, Relocation of the United States 
Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.) (Sept. 28, 2018). 
57. Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and 
Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, 2018 I.C.J. 175 at 28 (Oct. 3). 
58. Id. 
59. U.S. Terminates 1955 ‘Friendship’ Treaty With Iran After UN Court 
Ruling, RFERL (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.rferl.org /a/u-s-terminates-
1955-friendship-treaty-with-iran-after-un-court-ruling/29523774.html 
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withdrawals, Ambassador Bolton stated, “The United States will not 
sit idly by as baseless, politicized claims are brought against us.”60 
The Trump Administration was right to withdraw from the 
Treaty of Amity.  Notwithstanding the severing of U.S. diplomatic 
relations with Iran after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 1979, 
U.S. policy has always been to try to separate U.S. friendship and 
support for the Iranian people from U.S. dislike of Iranian government 
policies.61 Hence, it made sense for the U.S. to try to remain in the 
Treaty in order to emphasize U.S. respect for the Iranian people and 
to ensure the rights of Americans in Iran. However, the Iranian 
government has now relied on the treaty to sue the United States in 
the ICJ three times, first in 1992 in the Oil Platforms case (which 
Iran filed after U.S. forces attacked Iranian oil rigs that had been used 
to mine the Persian Gulf),62 then in 2016 in the Certain Iranian 
Assets case (which Iran filed after the U.S. allowed the attachment of 
Iranian assets to pay terrorism judgments),63 and again in July 2018 
in the Nuclear Sanctions case.64 The United States probably should 
have withdrawn from the Treaty in 1992 when the Oil Platforms case 
was filed, or at least in 1996 after the Court concluded that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case over U.S. objections.65 In any event, given 
the Iranian government’s continued reliance on the Treaty as an 
instrument of lawfare, it is legally prudent—although Secretary 
Pompeo might have acknowledged that it is “regrettable”— that the 
U.S. withdraw from the Treaty.  
In contrast, it was unnecessary and potentially counterproductive 
for the Trump administration to withdraw from the Optional Protocol 
to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). 
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62. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 803 (Dec. 12). 
63. Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 54.  
64. Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 57, at 18 (holding the U.S. 
should terminate its new “May 8” sanctions against Iran). 
65. Oil Platforms, supra note 62. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
The Trump Administration’s Approach to International Law and Courts 
19 
Ambassador Bolton stated that the withdrawal was “consistent with” 
the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) in 2005 (when 
I was Legal Adviser).66 However, the two situations are very different. 
The Bush administration decided to withdraw from the Optional 
Protocol to the VCCR only after it had been sued three times before 
the ICJ (by Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico) for the failure of state 
and local law enforcement officials to provide consular notice to 
foreign nationals arrested in the United States and after the ICJ had 
ruled against the United States in two of the three cases (LaGrand67 
in 2001 and Avena68 in 2004—Paraguay discontinued its case in 
1998).69 In 2005, upon the recommendation of Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice and following lengthy interagency discussions, 
President Bush ordered U.S. states to comply with the ICJ’s ruling in 
the Avena case (which required the U.S. to review the convictions and 
death sentences of fifty-one Mexican nationals who had not been 
given consular notice at the time of their arrest) but determined that 
the U.S. would withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR to 
prevent further cases against the United States for 
inadvertent failures by local officials to provide consular notice.70 In 
contrast, there has been no pattern and practice of other governments 
suing (much less prevailing against) the United States in the ICJ for 
violations of the VCDR. Moreover, the United States will have very 
strong arguments to defend in the case filed by Palestine and is very 
likely to win. Hence, withdrawal from the Optional Protocol appears 
to be an overreaction, motivated more by ideological dislike of the 
ICJ (which John Bolton called “politicized and ineffective”)71 than by 
any real legal necessity. Withdrawing from the VCDR Optional 
Protocol also means that the United States will give up its own right 
to sue other states if they violate their VCDR obligations to the 
United States. (For example, the U.S. successfully sued Iran in the 
ICJ in 1980 for violations of both the VCDR and VCCR for seizing 
the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding American diplomats 
 
66. Rampton, supra note 60. 
67. LaGrand (Ger. V. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
68. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
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U.S.), Order, 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10). 
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TIMES (Mar. 10, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/ politics/us-
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[https://perma.cc/VNF4-6PF2]. 
71. Rampton, supra note 62. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019) 
The Trump Administration’s Approach to International Law and Courts 
20 
hostage.72) In sum, for reasons that appear to be purely speculative 
(in contrast to the reasons for the U.S. withdrawal from the VCCR 
Optional Protocol), the Trump administration is depriving future U.S. 
presidents of a valuable legal tool to defend U.S. diplomats and 
embassies.  
Going forward, the issue to watch in the two Iran cases is what 
the Trump administration will do if the Court rules in favor of Iran 
again, such as by concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the cases 
or ordering the return of Iran’s Central Bank assets.   Currently, the 
Trump administration has permitted the State Department to treat 
these cases seriously and defend them vigorously, just as the State 
Department did during the Bush administration when Iran sued the 
United States in the Oil Platforms case and Mexico sued the U.S. in 
the Avena case.73   
But if the Court were to conclude, over strong U.S. objections, 
that it has jurisdiction to hear these new Iran cases, it is possible that 
the Administration might decide that the U.S. will not continue to 
appear for the merits phases of the cases.   This would, of course, be 
just what the Reagan administration did in the Nicaragua case in 
1981, when the U.S. withdrew from the case after the Court ruled 
that it had jurisdiction.74  Ambassador Bolton cited the Reagan 
administration’s action approvingly when he announced the U.S. 
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the VCDR.75   The 
Nicaragua withdrawal has damaged the reputation of the U.S. for 
respect for international law to this day.76   A withdrawal from the 
two Iran cases might be popular with some critics of international 
courts, but it would further damage the reputation of the United 
States as a country committed to international law.  It would also 
make it virtually impossible for the United States to criticize China, 
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or any other country, that refuses to appear before an international 
tribunal. 
The case filed against the United States by the “State of 
Palestine” is even more specious than the two cases filed by Iran.  
First, it is questionable whether Palestine qualifies as a “state” with 
standing to file a claim with the ICJ. Even it does, it is dubious that 
the transfer of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem would be considered by 
the Court to raise an issue of interpretation or application of the 
VCDR.   Although the Trump administration is right to consider the 
case to be baseless and an abuse of the ICJ, the Administration 
should still appear and make its arguments rather than refuse to 
appear.  If the Administration appears, it is likely to win, most likely 
at the jurisdictional stage, and to be credited for respect for 
international dispute settlement.  In contrast, if the Administration 
were to refuse to appear, even in a baseless case, the United States 
would be criticized for disrespect for international courts. 
Treaties and International Agreements 
Let me turn to the Trump administration’s approach to treaties 
and international agreements more generally.   Richard Haass, the 
President of the Council on Foreign Relations, has said that if there is 
a defining doctrine so far of the Trump administration, it is the 
“withdrawal doctrine.”77   The President has withdrawn from the 
TPP, the Paris Climate Change Accord, and the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action.78   He has also threatened to withdraw79 from 
NAFTA,80 the WTO, the Korea-U.S. Trade Agreement,81 and even 
the North Atlantic Treaty.  
 
77. Richard N. Haass (@RichardHaass), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2017 6:40 AM), 
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It seems clear that President Trump dislikes large multilateral 
agreements.   Although he sees himself as a dealmaker, he prefers 
bilateral agreements, which allow the United States to be more 
transactional—to get something in return.82 
The question that bears watching is whether the President and 
his administration will take broader aim at other multilateral 
agreements and even bilateral treaties. 
There is at least some reason to be concerned.   At the very 
beginning of the Administration, a draft Executive Order entitled 
“Moratorium on New Multilateral Treaties” was leaked to the New 
York Times.83  The draft order expressed concern about a perceived 
“proliferation of multilateral treaties that purport to regulate 
activities that are domestic in nature.”84   The order cited as examples 
the CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(although the U.S. is not a party to either treaty).85   The order 
stated that these treaties are not appropriate matters for international 
agreements and instead can be used to force countries “to adhere to 
often radical domestic agendas.”86   Ostensibly to prevent the United 
States from becoming party to such treaties, the order would have 
created a Cabinet-level “Treaty Review Committee” to review all 
multilateral treaties which the United States was currently involved 
in negotiating or had already joined, and to recommend to the 
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President whether the United States should cease participation in 
negotiations or refuse to sign, or to withdraw from  certain treaties to 
which the U.S. was already a party.87 
Although this executive order was never signed, it obviously did 
reflect the view of at least some White House staff that prior 
administrations had engaged and potentially become party to 
multilateral treaties that were not appropriate.   Ironically, the two 
treaties it cited as examples of concern—the CEDAW and the Rights 
of the Child—the United States has never joined.88  It also reflected a 
lack of understanding of the treaty-making process, in which the 
Secretary of State and ultimately the White House seek interagency 
approval before the United States begins negotiating or transmits any 
treaty to the Senate.89   And even if this executive order was never 
signed, the question remains whether the Administration is engaged in 
any quieter internal review to determine whether it should withdraw 
from other multilateral treaties.  In October, for example, when 
Ambassador Bolton announced that the United States would 
withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, he also said that the Trump administration 
would “commence a review of all international agreements that may 
still expose the United States to purported binding jurisdiction, 
dispute resolution in the International Court of Justice.”90 
And with respect to treaties more generally, it is important to 
note that during the last twenty months, President Trump has 
transmitted only one new treaty to the Senate, and has not ratified 
any treaties approved by the Senate.91   The State Department has 
 
87. Id. 
88. Id.; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, supra note 85; Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, supra note 85. 
89. Jonathan B. Tucker, Interagency Bargaining and International Negotiation: 
Lessons from the Open Skies Treaty Talks, 12 NEGOT. J. 275, 276 (1996). 
90. Rampton, supra note 60. 
91. See Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. Dᴇᴘᴛ. ᴏf Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/ [https://perma.cc/ 78AH-
5WWB] (listing only one treaty  that has been submitted to the Senate 
since President Trump took office on January 20, 2017); see also Treaties 
Approved by the Senate During the 115th Congress, 
CONGRESS.GOV,https://www.congress.gov/search?q=%7B%22source%22%3
A%22treaties%22%2C%22congress%22%3A%22115%22%2C%22treaty-
status%22%3A%22Approved%22%7D [https://perma.cc/N568-GM2X] (last 
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not submitted a Treaty Priority List, which administrations generally 
submit to the Senate within the first 6-9 months to inform the Senate 
which treaties pending before the Senate the administration 
supports.92  In the last twenty months, the Senate has approved six 
treaties,93 but President Trump has not ratified any of them.94    
By way of comparison, during President Bush’s first two years in 
office, the Senate approved twenty treaties,95 during his next two 
years the Senate approved an additional thirty-three treaties,96 and in 
his second term while I was Legal Adviser, the Senate approved an 
additional 110 treaties,97 for a total of 163 treaties approved by the 
Senate during President Bush’s eight years in office.   By way of 
further comparison, during President Obama’s eight years in office, 
the Senate approved only twenty treaties.98 
So, the key issues that bear watching with respect to treaties and 
international agreements are whether President Trump will withdraw 
from any more Senate-approved treaties, and whether he will end up 
with the worst treaty record by the numbers of any recent president. 
Human Rights 
I want to end with a few observations about the Administration’s 
approach to human rights.    
Unfortunately, the cold truth is that neither President Trump nor 
any senior member of his administration appear to care about 
international human rights or the historic U.S. role as a leader and 
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advocate on human rights issues.   The President has repeatedly 
praised authoritarian leaders and human rights abusers like Putin, 
Duterte, and Kim Jung-un.99   He went so far as to say that Kim 
Jung-un—perhaps the most notorious human rights abuser in the 
world—”loves his people.”100   The only time I am aware that 
President Trump has personally raised human rights concerns is when 
he tweeted in December 2017 that he would be watching for “human 
rights violations” by the Iranian Government, a tweet that seemed to 
be motivated more by enmity towards Iran than concern about 
human rights.101 
The Administration’s National Security Strategy, issued last 
December, does not mention promoting human rights as a goal.102   
The strategy commits the Administration to support individual 
dignity, freedom, and the rule of law.103  Such good things, however, 
are cast as “American values,” rather than rights to which all people 
are entitled.104 The strategy does make several references to individual 
rights but the term “human rights” appears just once to warn that 
the United States will deny admission to “human rights 
abusers.”105   The Strategy goes out of its way to emphasize that “[w]e 
are not going to impose our values on others.”106  In other words, U.S. 
human rights policy will be only to lead by example and not to 
promote human rights in other countries.    This is not only a sharp 
departure from the bipartisan commitment to human rights 
promotion in previous administrations, both Republican and 
Democratic, but it is hard to see that the U.S. sets a positive example 
for the rest of the world when the President imposes a travel ban on 
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nationals from Muslim countries,107 attacks the free press,108 and 
encourages racial tensions.109  
And, of course, the Administration withdrew from U.S. 
participation in the Human Rights Council earlier this year.110   
Although this is not necessarily evidence of a disregard for human 
rights—the Bush administration chose not to join the Human Rights 
Council when it was established111—the Trump administration’s 
withdrawal seemed to be motivated more by domestic political 
considerations than a desire to advance human rights more 
generally.112        
In short, the Trump administration has abandoned the traditional 
U.S. role as a leader in promoting international human rights.   
Bipartisan support for human rights remains strong in Congress, and 
career officials will continue their efforts, but it is hard for the U.S. to 
lead with any credibility, given the tweets and actions of the 
President.      
Conclusion 
In sum, it is still too early to tell whether we are witnessing the 
“greatest presidential onslaught on international law and international 
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institutions in American history.”113   But the warning signs may be 
there, starting with Ambassador Bolton’s fierce attack on the ICC 
and the Administration’s subsequent withdrawal from the Treaty of 
Amity with Iran and the Optional Protocol to the VCDR.   
Ambassador Bolton’s speech on Monday114 reflects a much more 
aggressive stance by the Trump administration towards international 
law and institutions, and there may be more to come.    
A potential ray of light is that most of the senior Administration 
lawyers, including the State Department Legal Adviser, are 
reasonably centrist lawyers who served in the Bush administration 
and do not appear to be personally hostile towards international 
law.115 But they may have limited ability to steer the 
Administration’s international law agenda if it is set by the President 
and the National Security Advisor. 
I do want to end with an appeal to the law students in the room.  
I hope that the current turbulence in our government does not deter 
you from entering public service.   Although disconcerting and 
distracting, most of this turbulence is taking place at the White 
House and the higher political levels.   The government still needs 
talented lawyers at the State Department, Justice Department, 
Defense Department, Treasury Department, and elsewhere.   Our 
institutions remain strong, but they can only remain strong if talented 
people continue to serve.  So my plea to you is this: Please do not be 
deterred.   There are plenty of interesting international law jobs in 
the U.S. Government and your government needs you. Please serve.        
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